Why Manchester United Continue to Struggle Under Ten Hag
In the summer, Manchester United’s new sporting management renewed Erik ten Hag’s contract until 2026 and showed their faith in the specialist by spending more than €200 million on new players. But United still do not show a stable game, and currently find themselves in 14th place.
After the games against Porto and Aston Villa, Ten Hag gave journalists another controversial interview, turning even the most loyal fans of the Dutch manager against himself. In this text, Nick Bobrov will talk about United’s game at the start of the season, and answer the question – are the head coach’s words about progress justified?
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Build-up
United have once again started the season without a profile left-back – Luke Shaw returned from the European Championships injured, Tyrell Malacia has been out for over a year. 17-year-old Harry Amass has looked good in friendlies, but Erik Ten Hag believes the youngster is ‘physically not ready. Diogo Dalot was the only alternative.
When playing on the left flank, Dalot is severely restricted by his weak foot, and his overlaps sometimes even slow down United’s attack because Dalot rarely crosses with his left. He spends extra seconds to pause and then cross with his right foot, so Ten Hag uses the Portuguese as an inverted fullback.
Dalot shifts from the flank to the centre of the pitch at the start of an attack and is positioned in line with the central midfielder. Dalot is very active without the ball and has an excellent understanding of the principles of filling space – he spots free areas and makes timely accelerations, creates additional options for passing with his movement and does not duplicate his partners’ positions.
The Portuguese defenderplays an important role in the build-up. Higher up the pitch, Dalot may find himself covering the half-space in the top five. From there he combines well with his partners in tight spaces, and often makes runs into the pocket between the centre-back and the fullback.
Ten Hag is using a 3-2 structure with shifts from fullbacks in build-up for the second year. In the 23-24 season, one of United’s fullbacks stayed in the bottom three with the centre-backs, or moved up to the top two. In the second case, Casemiro would drop lower and take up a position between the wide-spread centre-backs.
At the start of the 24-25 season, the structure was maintained. In the front line, along with the centre-backs, the right-back Noussair Mazraoui remained, Dalot went into the middle, the left-sided central midfielder moved higher and controlled the left half-space in the top five. But from September onwards, United made changes to the structure – the left-sided central midfielder, usually Christian Eriksen, began to shift constantly to the left-hand side during build-up.
Eriksen’s regular appearances in the starting line-up have had a positive effect on ball movement. The possession structure has become more varied, with the team now able to switch from a 3-2-5 to a 4-2-4 in the course of a single attack. With the change in formation, Lisandro Martinez and Mazraoui return to the starting positions, Eriksen takes his place on the wing, Dalot and Kobbie Mainoo in the middle.
Constant movement and position changes make it difficult for the opposition to press. Eriksen’s obvious advantages over Casemiro – technique and vision of the pitch – are added to them, with the Dane making it much easier to resist the opponents’ pressing. Of course, Eriksen lacks athleticism in defensive transitions, but the pros outweigh the cons.
Switching to a 4-2-4, the wingers in the top four are responsible for width, with Bruno Fernandes and Joshua Zirkzee offering themselves for a pass in the centre channels. Both can either bounce deep or accelerate in-behind, giving their partners more options to get out of pressure.
United’s build-up has indeed become better and more stable. But Ten Hag’s team is still a long way from the league leaders, the matches against Liverpool and Tottenham were terrible in terms of getting out of defence through passing. The team drowned under aggressive pressure – clamping down on the flanks, switching to panicky long passes, and committing too many individual errors in own third.
In the context of possession loss, Lisandro Martinez stands out negatively. There are no questions about the Argentine’s technique and vision, he still regularly finds his partners with passes between the lines and in-behind passes. Decision making is a concern – the Argentine has often been slow with the ball, choosing far too risky options, leading to losses in own third.
Positional attack: Zirkzee’s influence and isolations for wingers
In the new season, United has been marginally better at creating chances, averaging 1.57 xG per game compared to 1.34 xG last year. In the 23-24 season, Erik ten Hag’s team had particular difficulty playing against teams defending in a low block. United were spread out in a 3-2-5 structure, but there was little movement in the forward line – Rasmus Højlund had no space to run in-behind and the Dane was often let down by technique when dropping deeper. Progress in creating chances was due to the emergence of Joshua Zirkzee.
Zirkzee is as different as possible from Højlund. The Dane shows his strengths in transitions, when the opponent lets him accelerate, while Zirkzee, on the contrary, is more comfortable playing in tight spaces. Despite his large size, the Dutchman is very malleable – he works with the ball skillfully, destroys opponents with sharp false movements, and is not afraid to dribble. Over the last calendar year, Zirkzee has the 96th percentile in the number of successful dribbles among forwards.
In possession, United’s summer transfer gives the team an extra option between the lines. He is more active than Højlund in offering himself for a pass, and is more likely to meet the ball in the middle of the pitch. In all of last season’s EPL, Højlund gave 14 passes in the final third, Zirkzee has already made 9. The Dutchman regularly scans the pitch in search of a free zone, doesn’t spend much time handling the ball when he receives it, often plays one-twos, and doesn’t let the tempo of the attack slow down.
When opponents use a personal defence, Zirkzee’s movement deep creates an area for a pass in-behind. The United striker pulls the opposing centre-back out of the line, the winger accelerates into the space and the pass is made.
At United, Zirkzee has faced an atypical problem. Over the course of his career, he had 2 seasons as the team’s main striker, both times the Dutchman scored more than expected. At United, Zirkzee gets regular chances and is disciplined in his shot selection. Almost all of his attempts are from the centre of the penalty area, and Zirkzee’s average shot weight is a solid 0.27 xG – of the main strikers at EPL clubs, only Jamie Vardy has more. But by mid-October the United newcomer has only 1 goal scored, and 4 missed big chances.
Photo: Understat
Isolation for Wingers
Zirkzee’s openings in the centre channel pulls the opposition tighter, the flanks are freer and there is more space for 1v1 situations. United take advantage of this vulnerability and create isolations for wingers with switches.
In the past 7 rounds, Erik ten Hag’s side have made 76% of their attacks through the flanks – the most in the league – and for the first time in 3 seasons under the Dutchman, they are attacking more often through the right side. The reason lies in the good form of Amad Diallo.
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He has been United’s most active player in friendlies, and at the start of the EPL he deserves a place in the starting line-up. Diallo is keen on creating danger, when he receives the ball, he is brave enough to dribble around several opponents.
The Ivorian’s dribbling is unpredictable, he can both move to the centre and shoot with his left, go to the front and make a cross with his right. Mazraoui actively helps Diallo, the Moroccan creates a 2v1 situation with his overlaps. The opponents’ fullback has to choose between two bad options – risky pulling out or passing all the way to his own penalty area.
Diallo is one of the top 10 players in the EPL for shot creating actions, but he has room to progress – Diallo’s decision-making sometimes lets him down. He can ignore a partner in a more favourable position, take unnecessarily risky dribbles, delay a decision and ruin the tempo of the attack. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Ivorian started to sit on the bench more often at the beginning of October.
United’s unstable Marcus Rashford comes into the starting line-up on the left wing. After a dreadful August – the Englishman failed to make a single shot in the first three rounds of the EPL – Rashford was unjustifiably savaged in the media. The criticism worked on the United winger, he scored against Southampton and Porto, destroyed opponents in Europa League matches with cheeky feints, seemed to resemble the best version of himself, but…
In the match against Aston Villa, he twice aggressively drove into the opponent’s legs, after which he was urgently replaced by Antony. Perhaps Erik ten Hag should finally reconsider Rashford’s status in the team, and give Alejandro Garnacho more playing time.
Out of Possession
In defence, United are using a 4-4-2 formation, with Bruno Fernandes moving up on one line with the striker. Compared to last season, the defensive performance has improved slightly from 1.67 NPxGA/90 to 1.50. The team’s play without the ball shows a trend towards increased intensity, with United tackling their opponents more often. At the start of the 24-25 season, Erik Ten Hag’s team leads the EPL in terms of the number of attempted tackles and interceptions, having recorded an increase in this indicator in all thirds of the pitch.
In high pressing, United’s main objective has remained the same for three seasons now – to initiate pressure when opponent makes a back/lateral pass, push the opponent down the flank, limit the space, take the ball away and organise a counter-attack. The increase of PPDA, is influenced by the style of play of United’s summer transfers. In the first line of pressing, the team has become stronger thanks to the qualities of Joshua Zirkzee.
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The Dutch striker is very hardworking, more often than Højlund, and moves competently without the ball – he doesn’t press without looking at his partners, and when he does press, he runs at the opponent in an arcing path, not in a straight line. This way the striker covers more options for passing. Over the last calendar year, Zirkzee has averaged 1.02 tackles per game and has a 84th percentile ranking among forwards in that metric.
The second newcomer to impact the quality of the high pressing is Matthijs de Ligt – United finally have a regular partner for Lisandro Martinez, who is comfortable playing with a high defensive line. The Dutchman bravely steps out of the line, and not afraid to follow his opponent into the other half of the pitch, and if an in-behind pass goes, catches up the opponent thanks to his good speed.
With the arrival of De Ligt, the team became more compact, the gaps between the lines when pressing became less frequent, and the counter-pressing improved.
If it is not possible to make a high turnover, United roll into the middle block and defend in their own half of the pitch. The main task of the players is to cover the centre, the team defends narrowly, the flanks are often left free. When defending in the middle block, the team is divided into two groups – the top six players and the defenders.
When the opponent passes to the flank, the top group moves towards the ball area. The outermost midfielder advances on the ball carrier, the centre midfielder controls the pass into the middle, the player up the flank is guarded by the fullback. A player from the first pressing line either helps with the control of the centre or blocks the back pass. United’s mid-block defence was absolutely brilliant in the game against Aston Villa.
On the far flank there is a shift going on too, with the winger shifting closer to the middle, and controlling the far half-space. In the August games, the shift was poorly worked out, with opponents coming into the final third several times after switching from left to right, through Rashford’s area.
Ten Hag’s team have major problems when the opposing fullback takes a narrow position in the half-space and takes United’s winger with him. The opponent has a player left in the width, if he receives a pass, United’s fullback has to make a long sprint, leaving his area free, or let the opponent receive the ball without any pressure.
If the fullback pulls out and is late to tackle, the opponent makes a one-touch pass to a partner who accelerates through the half-space. His run should be controlled by United’s close central midfielder, but Eriksen and Mainoo are not always able to react in time. The same principle works in the low block – 2 central defenders and the far side defender remain in the penalty box, the half-space is guarded by the close central midfielder.
Corners
Andreas Georgsson joined Erik Ten Hag’s coaching staff as set-piece coach in the summer. The Swede is another of Ten Hag’s assistant with head coaching experience, having managed Lilleström before joining United. Prior to Norway, Georgsson was a set-piece coach at Brentford and Arsenal.
Offensive corners
When taking corners at the opponents’ goal, United utilise a play designed under De Ligt. Georgsson uses a formation with 6 players in the penalty area and 2 in the rebounding area. 1 player each is positioned on the near and far post, 3 in the centre of the penalty area.
De Ligt is above them, closer to the penalty line, 2 players control the rebounding area. A centre midfielder (Mainoo/Manuel Ugarte) is used on the far post, there is no specific player on the near post. The trio in the centre of the penalty box consists of Dalot, Martinez and Zirkzee, Fernandes and someone from the Diallo/Alejandro Garnacho pairing are positioned in the rebounding area. When De Ligt is absent, his role is filled by Harry Maguire.
The area, where the cross goes, depends on De Ligt’s marking. If the Dutchman is man-marked, the cross goes to the far edge of the penalty area, behind the penalty spot. At the moment of cross, the trio in the centre of the penalty area attack the goal – Dalot accelerates towards the near post, Martinez and Zirkzee to the centre of the goal. With their movement, they clear space for the right centre-back.
De Ligt starts towards the far side of the penalty area. Cross into this area has two advantages. Firstly, it is risky for the goalkeeper to go so far, secondly, De Ligt has time to accelerate and gain a dynamic advantage. The United defender’s job is to shoot in the centre of the goal.
If De Ligt isn’t man-marked, as he was against Crystal Palace, the pass goes to the far post. Together with the centre midfielder, the Dutchman creates a 2v1 situation in the area. His partner pulls the opposition player down on him, De Ligt accelerates and shoots unopposed.
United have an alternative, improved formation in the penalty area. The number of players remains the same, but the positioning of the players on the posts changes – one of them takes up a position in the centre of the goalkeeper’s box, the other becomes between De Ligt and the trio in the centre of the penalty area.
The player in the goalkeeper’s box, Højlund or the centre midfielder, prevents the opposing goalkeeper from coming out to claim the cross. The player between De Ligt and the trio in the centre of the penalty box becomes an extra buffer for the Dutchman.
He either puts a block under De Ligt or creates even more space for the Dutchman with a run. Rashford fulfills this role, but the Englishman is very passive in his blocks. The pass goes to the far side of the penalty area. United used this structure in games against Porto and Aston Villa.
In 7 games in the EPL, De Ligt has had 6 shots on goal, with 4 of those shots coming from corners. The United rookie has a cumulative xG of 1.11 – only Tottenham’s Cristian Romero and Arsenal’s Gabriel Magalhaes have more among defenders. Ironically, De Ligt scored his only goal after an atypical corner.
Defensive Corner Kicks
On corners at Onana’s goal, Georgsson kept the formation of last season, you can read more about United’s play on corners in our text from earlier in the year. Briefly: the team uses a mixed type of defence, 4 players in the goalkeeper’s area, 4 players guarding opponents personally, 1 player in the rebounding area, 1 player occupying the area depending on the play – either doubling the near post, or positioned on the edge of the penalty area to control a short play, or assisting in the rebounding area.
Fernandes starts the episode at the near post, with the right centre-back and striker in the centre of the penalty area and Dalot at the far post. The personnel group consists of Martinez, two centre midfielders and Mazraoui. Occasionally the stronger centre midfielder, Ugarte or Casemiro, swap positions with the striker. A right winger is positioned in the rebounding area, left winger’s position is fluid.
Compared to last season, United’s performance on defensive corners has improved slightly. For example, the number of shots allowed per match has dropped from 1.75 to 1.29, the average weight of a shot has also become lower – 0.069 in the 23/24 season compared to 0.060 at the start of the 24/25 season.
Of the 9 shots allowed, Fulham and Aston Villa players took more than half of them. Both teams pressed United deep into the penalty area, but took different approaches. Fulham executed crosses to the near post, and had two shots from that area early in the second half. Marco Silva’s team then switched to a so-called “Sparta” combination as the match progressed, and created several more dangerous approaches.
All of Fulham’s players filled the goalkeeper’s box, and when served, made a run to the near post, from where a cross was headed into the goal. Half of Villa’s corners were played short, with the aim of putting a player in the rebounding area – Garnacho did not have time to cover a large area alone. Andre Onana made an excellent save after Youri Tielemans’ shot, and Matty Cash’s attempt went just over the bar.
Conclusion
Manchester United are really progressing compared to last season, Ten Hag is not lying to the fans. The build-up has become more varied, the numbers on chances allowed and created have improved, the set-pieces have become a bit better. But this progress has 3 problems at once.
Firstly, it is affected by the ‘low base effect’ – United’s results last season were historically poor, it was quite easy to get better. Secondly, even in such circumstances, progress is marginal, the team still has a negative NPxG difference. Thirdly, progress under Ten Hag is not gradual, it is achieved by leaps and bounds, there is no stability. First the team loses to Liverpool without a chance, then has good matches against Southampton and Crystal Palace, then suffers humiliation at the hands of Tottenham, and then gives a great defensive performance against Aston Villa.
In my opinion, the decision on Ten Hag lies in the realm of psychology. United have been out of favour for a long time now, needing a defibrillator rather than new pills. Despite the trust placed in him at the end of last season, if I were the new management, I’d go for the tough decision and sack Ten Hag before the November international break.
Ruud? Tuchel? McKenna? Carrick? Only time will tell. However, one thing’s for sure: Ten Hag has his work cut out for him as he looks to avoid an early dismissal.
By: @normalnik131
Featured Image: @GabFoligno / Ash Donelon / Man United