Analyzing Manchester United’s Corner Kick Strategy Under Ruben Amorim

One of the main subjects for criticism in Ruben Amorim’s first month at Manchester United was defending corner kicks. The lack of a well-coordinated game in open-play was understandable due to the abrupt change in the playing system, the Portuguese’s directness at press conferences was a buy-in, the fans were ready to wait. But a few glaring failures at the set-pieces pissed off even the most patient. Two goals conceded vs. Arsenal, a 1st minute goal from Nottingham Forest and direct corner kicks from Matheus Cunha, Heung-min Son and Kieran Trippier made the Portuguese an easy target for media attacks. 

But after a series of setbacks, United seem to have recovered. In 2025, opponents are hitting Andre Onana’s goal less often, and the average danger of their shots has dropped noticeably. This text is an attempt to understand the dynamics of the team’s play on corners in defence and to look for patterns in offensive corners.

The study takes Manchester United’s corner kicks under Ruben Amorim in EPL matches of the 24-25 season in full squads from November to today.

Defensive corners

With Ruben Amorim’s arrival at the club, the defensive style at corners hasn’t changed globally, but differences can be found in the nuances. Plus, small adjustments have been made as the season progressed. 

‘United still uses a mixed defensive system. The team is divided into 2 groups – players from the zonal group, consisting of 5-6 players, are placed on the edges of the goalkeeper’s area, 2-3 players mark opponents personally, the rest control the rebounding area or short draws.

Like last season, opponents serve most of corner kicks to the near post. Andreas Georgsson pays special attention to the defence of this zone, it is almost always double-teamed. If the opponent has a prepared play with a feed to the near post, even 3 players can end up here – this was the case in the matches against Arsenal and Liverpool.

Under Erik ten Hag, Bruno Fernandes and the striker were responsible for controlling the near post. Until mid-February, Amorim used the Portuguese in a similar role, but since the game against Tottenham, Fernandes has been defending personally or catching rebounds, with Joshua Zirkzee and Casemiro defending at the near post. In the 5 matches since the reshuffle, United have not allowed a single shot from this area.

Two tall centre-backs and Diogo Dalot are responsible for defending the centre of the goalie box. The third centre-back, Lisandro Martinez or Noussair Mazraoui, has been used in other roles for almost the entire stretch under Amorim – the Moroccan defends the far post, Martinez used to double up at the near post or defending personally before his injury.

The use of Diogo Dalot inside the goalie box is not obvious, Mazraoui and Manuel Ugarte could be alternatives to the Portuguese. The choice in favour of Dalot can be explained by two factors. Firstly, he is superior to both of them in aerials. Before cross, Dalot is not static, he slightly bounces on both legs, preparing himself for the main jump. On the other hand, Dalot’s timing is not the best. Sometimes he jumps too early, so the ball flies over him.

Secondly, Dalot is worse than his partners in 1v1 defence. He competently keeps his opponent in front of him, but he doesn’t always have the sharpness and first step to keep up with the change of pace and direction. In an attempt to catch his opponent, the Portuguese helps himself with his hands, grabbing and pushing – a dangerous habit in the VAR era.

Filling the personnel group depends on the matchday squad. Before the beginning of February, it most often consisted of a couple of central midfielders, to which occasionally added Højlund or Martinez. For example, in the game against City, the Dane personally guarded Erling Haaland, and in the match against Nottingham Forest, Martinez played with Nikola Milenkovic.

Amorim used Amad Diallo and Alejandro Garnacho in the rebounding area. They were regularly placed in sub-optimal positions, dropping to the level of the penalty spot, which created two problems at once. Firstly, the space in front of the penalty box was less controlled and the opponents had more time to make a decision. Secondly, the potential for counterattacks was reduced. As the season progressed, there was some progress in this aspect, such situations appear less and less. 

Small adjustments were made after Diallo’s injury at the beginning of February, but the general idea has been maintained. The Ivorian’s slot in the rebounding area was taken by Patrick Dorgu. One of the central midfielders (Casemiro) moved to the near post, Fernandes took over his role, and Højlund was used against the most dangerous opponents’ players at corners. Surprisingly, given the fact that last season the Dane was one of the main vulnerabilities during at them.

Defensive corners against Arsenal

In the December match, Ruben Amorim’s team defended well in open-play episodes, but were destroyed at the set-pieces – Arsenal shot 7 times after corners, shots from Jürrien Timber and William Saliba ended in goal. United failed for several reasons. =

Firstly, the coaching staff got the emphasis wrong and concentrated too much on controlling one area.By moving a player from the personal group to the near post, where Arsenal’s crosses most often go, the team regularly found themselves in a 2v5 situation at the far post. The dynamic advantage was on the side of Mikel Arteta’s team, already on the first corner Thomas Partey dangerously shot from the near post. Other attempts didn’t end as shots due to overly heavy crosses from Bukayo Saka. 

Secondly, United failed to adapt as the match progressed. In the first half, Arsenal served all corners to the near post or to the centre of the goalkeeper’s box, but after the break, three times they used the option of serving to the far post, where an extra player remained. One of the corners ended in a goal by Saliba, while in another episode, Mikel Merino shot dangerously.

The only positive was the play of Andre Onana – he played aggressively at the exits, several times knocking the ball out with his fist. Atypical for the Cameroonian, who is often frozen on the goal line. United looked better in the cup match, due to their own preparation and Nicolas Jover’s tactical changes, which were probably influenced by Onana’s excellent play.

Arsenal is extremely skillful at delaying their corner kicks, with Arteta’s team taking the longest time to prepare them in the EPL. Such pauses have a psychological effect on opponents, making them nervous in anticipation of another dangerous cross. In the EPL United gave in to trickery, in the cup they responded with aggression – Højlund was constantly pushing Saliba and wrapping his arms around the Frenchman. Twice the referee had to stop the game to talk to the players. After replacing the Dane, the role of the hooligan was taken by Tyrell Malacia. 

The move can be called a successful one. ‘Arsenal’ used various types of corners, but struck only 3 strikes after corners. All in extra time, when Amorim’s team had already played more than 30 minutes in the minority, all non-dangerous. 

The second aspect that helped United was the changes of Nicolas Jover. United’s goalkeeper’s play in the league match levelled some of the threat from Arsenal’s corners, so in the cup game Jover moved 2 players from the far post to the goalkeeper. But United’s players defended their goalkeeper well and instead of a positive effect, Arsenal lost the sharpness from their serves and Altay Bayindir produced a classy performance, restoring his reputation after a poor performance against Tottenham. 

United made another change in their home EPL match. Only Garnacho was left in the rebounding area, the other player moved to the personalised group. Amorim’s team began to control the movement in the penalty area better, but left too much space in front of it. ‘Arsenal struck 4 times from zone 14 – twice after a rebound, once after a short draw, another after a direct feed to Declan Rice.

Offensive corners

At the start of the season, Manchester United often used play with a cross to the far post, prepared under Matthijs De Ligt. The author of the idea was new standards coach Andreas Georgsson. The Swede was one of the few who remained on the coaching staff with the arrival of Amorim, but despite this, United stopped regularly feeding the Dutchman. Georgeson had a new idea after the game against Arsenal and in the next round Amorim’s team used a similar play to the Nicolas Jover’s ideas. 

When serving, there are 6 players inside the penalty box. 4 move towards the shooter, most often Dalot, 2 centre-backs and a striker or central midfielder. The Portuguese attacks the near post, the others are clearing space rather than attacking a specific area. 

Another player prevents the goalkeeper from coming out of the goalkeeper’s box and intercepting the pass. Before the injury this role was taken by Kobbie Mainoo, after the injury he is replaced by a striker. The sixth player, usually Martinez, hides on the far post and waits for a 1v1 situation.

There are 2 players in the rebounding area, Garnacho and the second wingback. The Argentine can move to the corner of the penalty area for a short draw. United’s last winger usually occupies a position closer to the centre of the pitch, but sometimes comes into the rebounding area to immediately smother the opponent’s counterattacks.

The movement of players inside the penalty area not only helps to create a 1v1 situation on the far side, but also partially offsets one of Bruno Fernandes’ few disadvantages – corner kicks. If the Portuguese doesn’t beat the near post and the ball doesn’t reach Martinez, the ball is shot by someone in the attacking group, who has a dynamic advantage over static defenders.

Over the course of the season, the players’ progress in understanding the draw can be seen. In the first matches after the introduction, the rushing group was positioned in the centre of the goalie box, with some players immediately taking up a position on the near post. In this way they stole a few extra metres for manoeuvre. After about a month their positions changed, starting with the game against Brighton, the runners make a dash for the far post. 

United had a few strikes after a similar play, but only scored 1 goal against Ipswich. There is still certainly room for growth. For example, the players inside the penalty box don’t always get the timing right to accelerate – they start either too early or, on the contrary, they lag in their spurt and don’t create ‘controlled chaos’ inside the penalty box. 

Kobbie Mainoo: Manchester United’s English Midfield Metronome

In addition to the basic draw, there is another variation in which two players are left on the far post. Harry Maguire is added to Martinez, and the centre midfielder puts a block under the Englishman. A similar play was used in the games against Bournemouth and Crystal Palace.

In the away games against Liverpool and Tottenham, Amorim’s team moved away from the classic system. At Anfield, the Sparta draw was used, with all players inside the penalty area filling the goalie box in the expectation of a lucky ricochet. In London, Maguire was the target for right-side crosses, taking his position on the penalty spot rather than on the far post. In a few more games used a direct feed into the zone 14 for a volley, thus was scored the first goal against Everton at Old Trafford.

Rare short corners followed the following script – pass to the corner of the penalty area, reverse pass, feed to the far post to the centre-back’s run from the penalty spot. These were seen in Amorim’s first meeting with Ipswich and in the March games against Arsenal and Leicester.

By: @normalnik131

Featured Image: @GabFoligno / Justin Setterfield / Getty Images