Manchester United’s Struggles under Ruben Amorim: A Problem of Principles or Personnel
Ten months into Ruben Amorim’s reign at Manchester United, the club has undergone numerous changes at both hierarchical and technical levels.
First-team coach Andreas Georgson left in May after a year in the role, while Dan Ashworth shockingly departed his position last December. Darren Fletcher moved to take charge of the U-18s—having previously served as a first-team coach under Amorim—while Acacio Valentim arrived from Braga to replace Jackie Kay as head of operations.
Jason Wilcox was promoted to director of football in June, and a state-of-the-art, refurbished training hub at Carrington was unveiled ahead of the season opener. Yet, one thing has remained unchanged: Amorim’s structural approach to games.
One might assume that a string of lacklustre performances and poor results would push for a tactical adjustment. Still, the Portuguese manager reaffirmed his commitment to the system after Sunday’s dismal 3-0 defeat to Manchester City—his eighth away loss and the lowest away points tally of any ever-present side in the competition since he took charge in November 2024.
“I’m not going to change,” he said. “When I want to change my philosophy, I will change. If not, you have to change the man.” With 33 games to go, no European football and hopefully an FA Cup run beyond the third round, concerns are raised over the club’s ability to challenge for a Champions League spot and at least show progress in their style of play.
However, the early signs do not indicate progress under Amorim. In the 1-1 draw against Fulham in August, head coach Marco Silva and midfielder Alex Iwobi nearly laid out a full tactical breakdown of how Amorim plays and sets up his team, and perhaps this has led to the Portuguese having the third lowest win rate, 26% (8/31), as manager of the club, behind Alfred Albut (20%) and Scott Duncan (24%).
As Jose Mourinho once said, ‘There are coaches who try things that don’t work and fail, but they say, “I died with my idea.” If you die with your idea, you’re stupid. Coaches have to adapt their ideas to what they have.’
Amorim’s commitment to his system could be his undoing, as there are no signs of improvement after ten months. To put it into context, Thomas Tuchel needed only four months to turn the tide at Chelsea, having been appointed in January 2021, where his side’s resolute three-at-the-back system saw his side keep 18 clean sheets in his first 24 matches as they went on to win the UEFA Champions League.
Antonio Conte switched to a three-at-the-back system after back-to-back losses to Liverpool and Arsenal. Subsequently, he kept six clean sheets in a row, losing only three games in the entire season following the introduction of this new formation in September. In the 2016-17 season, the Blues under the Italian manager kept the most clean sheets in the league (16) and also scored the second-most goals (85), only one behind top scorers Tottenham Hotspur.
Louis van Gaal, despite frequent criticism, often employed this approach. What distinguished him was his flexibility and ability to adapt formations and systems, ensuring his side had the best possible winning chances. Another notable success story with the system came under Ronald Koeman at Southampton. The Dutch manager, facing pressure after a run of six defeats in eight matches, switched to a back-three setup for a 2-0 win over Watford — and the transformation was immediate.
The Saints went on to record six consecutive clean sheets, winning five of those games, with only a goalless draw at Arsenal—where they reverted to a 4-2-3-1—breaking the streak. That run lifted Southampton from 13th to sixth in just six matches. Most notably, Oliver Glasner has surgically transformed Crystal Palace with the three-at-the-back system that has seen the club clinch the FA Cup and Community Shield titles.
In contrast to Amorim’s United, they have accumulated a meagre 34 points from his 32 games in charge, including seven points from their five games this season, their poorest start to a league campaign since 1992-93. Since March, United have amassed just 16 points; this raises the question of whether United’s struggles stem from the manager’s principles and commitment to his formation, a lack of personnel to thrive in the system, or a poor tactical approach to games devoid of the formation.
Amorim’s setup explained
At Sporting CP, Amorim’s setup delivered consistent dominance, and that track record was central to United’s choice to appoint him. Even now, at just 40, he continues to show unwavering faith in the methods and philosophies that shaped his early coaching career. His blueprint revolves around a rigid 5-2-3 setup, where individuals are instructed to remain locked in their specific zones. Full-backs stretch the play out wide, midfielders are fixed in central areas, and positional interchanges are rarely seen.
The intention behind such discipline is to create overloads on different parts of the field. By engineering numerical advantages—especially down the flanks—his side attempts to progress towards attacking positions more efficiently. In principle, the presence of one extra player in any area should simplify advancing into dangerous territory.
To make this work, Amorim deploys a combination that often involves the wing-back, a central defender, the number 10, and a midfielder operating together in more expansive spaces. However, the higher level of competition in the Premier League has quickly highlighted the flaws of this system, exposing weaknesses that were not as evident during his time in Portugal. What once looked effective in Lisbon has so far proven unsuitable in England.
Can Amorim’s system overcome its flaws?
Oliver Glasner demonstrated at Crystal Palace last campaign that success in the FA Cup and European qualification can be achieved with a modest budget while operating in a 3-4-2-1 shape—proof that the system is effective in the Premier League. The lingering question is why Ruben Amorim has failed to replicate similar results at Manchester United.
Despite investing more than £200m to secure Bryan Mbeumo, Matheus Cunha and Benjamin Sesko during the summer window, the side has managed only four goals in as many fixtures. Scoring problems remain unresolved, highlighting one of the major setbacks of his tenure.
At the Etihad, Amorim started Patrick Dorgu and Noussair Mazraoui as wing-backs. Yet, across their 53 combined league appearances, they have produced a solitary assist without registering a single goal. That lack of end product from broad areas has compounded the struggle in attack, leaving United without sufficient creativity from the flanks.
The midfield has posed even greater concerns. Bruno Fernandes has been deployed as one of the two in Amorim’s central pairing. Still, his difficulties are mirrored by Casemiro and Manuel Ugarte, neither of whom has displayed the athletic range needed for such responsibilities. Out-of-possession deficiencies often stem from this department, and solutions appear distant.
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Fulham, Burnley and City have already exploited these shortcomings this season, underlining that elite opponents do not just expose United’s frailties. Amorim has made it clear he will not deviate from his philosophy, but the pressing issue remains—does he truly possess the personnel in midfield, the back three, or at wing-back to make his blueprint succeed?
At present, the outlook feels bleak — and if it isn’t tweaked or improved, the dreaded “club statement” that marked the exit of five of United’s last six managers looks inevitable.
By: Abasifreke Akpan / @freke_Akpan
Featured Image: @GabFoligno / Justin Setterfield / Getty Images