What if Spain score first and don't retreat like England?

Argentina have survived four consecutive knockout matches by finding solutions late. But have they really solved their problems... or have their opponents simply created the conditions for their comeback? With Spain awaiting in the World Cup final, one tactical question keeps coming back to my mind: What if Spain score first... and never retreat like England did? One of the most interesting patterns that stood out after Argentina completed the group stage is that they have decided all four of their knockout matches either in stoppage time or extra time. It started against a resilient Cape Verde side, followed by Egypt after falling two goals behind, then a determined Switzerland, and finally England—a team full of quality players but one that ultimately retreated too deep and, in my opinion, was let down by its coach's second-half game management. So why does Argentina often seem to come alive only during the final 15–20 minutes of matches? Why don't they control games from the very beginning, dominate possession, create a variety of attacking solutions, and score earlier, especially considering the quality of players available? For me, the answer is quite simple. Argentina have had several tactical issues throughout these four knockout matches, and Lionel Scaloni has managed to correct many of them during the second half, often with considerable success. Another factor is that Scaloni has adopted a noticeably different tactical approach compared to the group stage. His knockout setup has been much more cautious, particularly during the first half. Against both Egypt and Switzerland, he started Rodrigo De Paul and Leandro Paredes together alongside Alexis Mac Allister and Enzo Fernández, prioritizing midfield density over attacking fluidity. As a result, Messi and either Lautaro Martínez or Julián Álvarez were often left isolated up front. That is something Messi clearly doesn't prefer. In matches like these, he usually likes to drop deeper to help his team build from the back, especially when facing organized high pressing or compact defensive blocks. That happened repeatedly in two consecutive matches. The exception came against England. There, Argentina returned to something much closer to their group-stage structure. Giuliano Simeone made his first World Cup start, operating on the right flank instead of De Paul. Personally, I believe De Paul's greatest strengths on the right are delivering quality crosses and contributing defensively. However, I do not think that is his natural or most effective position. His best role remains in central midfield, where his defensive intensity and tactical awareness can have a much greater impact. Furthermore, using both De Paul and Paredes together often feels as though one of them disappears from the game. That became even more obvious when Paredes played as the lone defensive midfielder, with Enzo Fernández and Mac Allister enjoying greater freedom ahead of him. The first half against England was one of Argentina's strongest tactical and physical performances of the tournament, despite the obvious caution against a physically powerful opponent. Even so, Argentina controlled the game thanks to that midfield balance, combined with Giuliano Simeone's good work down the right. The second half, however, unfolded very differently. England became more adventurous and opened the scoring. From that moment, their coach began making a series of tactical mistakes. The team retreated far too deep, almost as if protecting a lead for far too long, before making several defensive substitutions. First, he withdrew Jordan, the goalscorer and one of England's best performers, then removed Declan Rice, one of the team's most influential midfielders, replacing them with players whose primary objective was simply to reinforce the defensive structure. Those decisions made Argentina's task considerably easier. They increased the tempo, attacked with greater variety, and introduced Nicolás González to strengthen the left side with crosses, overlapping runs, and additional attacking movement. Although Scaloni also made three substitutions at once—including De Paul, whose crossing ability from the right is among Argentina's best—there was still one obvious question: Who was he supposed to cross to without two strikers inside the penalty area and sufficient support arriving from midfielder? For me, the logical decision at that stage was to introduce Lautaro Martínez much earlier and postpone the routine full-back substitution of Gonzalo Montiel for Nahuel Molina. In fact, I believe Lisandro Martínez could just as easily have been the player sacrificed instead. Anyone who has closely followed Argentina throughout the tournament may have noticed several surprisingly simple positioning and marking mistakes from a defender representing one of the biggest clubs in world football. However, because England unexpectedly dropped so deep defensively, those questionable Argentine substitutions never became a major issue. Football often punishes teams that retreat excessively. After Lautaro Martínez was finally introduced with only ten minutes remaining, he scored Argentina's winning goal in stoppage time. Now comes the real question for Lionel Scaloni. Which players will he choose for the World Cup final against Spain? La Roja possess one of the most balanced starting line-ups in international football. Their youthful energy, particularly in midfield, played a decisive role in eliminating France—a team many considered tournament favourites thanks to their frightening attacking trio. Spain dominated possession, controlled the central areas, maintained compact distances between their lines, and consistently won the tactical battle in midfield, which has arguably been their greatest strength throughout the tournament. Then there is Lamine Yamal. Although he has not produced huge numbers in terms of goals or assists, he remains Spain's most influential attacking player—the type of footballer capable of deciding a match with one moment of brilliance. But what happens if Spain score first in the final... and refuse to defend deep like England and Argentina's previous knockout opponents? What solutions will Scaloni have? Will he once again wait until the 60th or 65th minute before introducing a second striker if Argentina are behind? Nobody knows. But it is an important question. What if Argentina fall behind and Spain continue attacking instead of retreating? Perhaps the even bigger question is this: What if Messi is not at his best, especially during the second half? We don't know the answers. All we can do is wait, watch, and see what happens in the decisive match for football's greatest prize—the 2026 FIFA World Cup Final.

Conclusion : The World Cup is rarely decided by talent alone. It is usually decided by the coach who adapts better when the original plan no longer works. Spain may have the tournament's most balanced midfield, while Argentina possess one of the greatest match-winners the game has ever seen. But if Spain score first and continue pressing instead of defending deep, Scaloni may face a tactical challenge unlike any he has encountered in the knockout stage. Perhaps Argentina will find another late solution. Perhaps Scaloni already has an answer. But if Spain refuse to repeat the mistakes of previous opponents, the World Cup final could become a completely different story.