Tactical Analysis: North London Derby

The North London derby holds a special place in the heart of Arsenal fans given the history and their dominance over Tottenham, but last weekend, Arsenal went into the derby as underdogs. The Gunners locked horns with their crosstown rivals on Sunday at the Tottenham Hotspur Stadium, and the home side would go on to take the lot with two first half goals and an overall dominant performance.

In the 2015/16 season, Arsenal and their North London rivals were competing at the upper echelon of English football, the Gunners finishing second in the league behind Leicester City whilst Tottenham placed third in the table. Five years on with three games left to play, they came into this game directly competing with Burnley for the final Europa League spot.

Both clubs had festered in mid-table positions throughout the year, with two major managerial changes coming midway through the season. Arsenal would part ways with Unai Emery and embark on a new journey with former club captain Mikel Arteta leading the ship, whilst Tottenham reached the end of their project with Mauricio Pochettino and appointed three-time Premier League champion José Mourinho. 

With both managers preparing for their first ever North London Derby, the Portuguese manager quipped, “To be the champion of north London means nothing for me because I think you have to be much bigger than that and have much more ambitions than that."

Mourinho had already been perceived as one of the most hated figures in the Arsenal fanbase even before his affiliation to Tottenham. Boasting a nine-game unbeaten run at home in his career against the Gunners, "The Special One" has found more and more ways to grind out results against the Gunners in his time at Manchester United and Chelsea.

During this tactical analysis, we’ll look at Arteta’s unique structure design when playing out the back, Alexander Lacazette’s influence as a false nine, both team’s wing-back focused attacks, and how Mourinho counteracted Arsenal’s tactics to overtake them in the table.

Line-ups

Spurs manager José Mourinho brought Toby Alderweireld back into the starting line-up along with Giovani Lo Celso who replaced the injured Tanguy Ndombélé. As for the away side, Mikel Arteta started Alexandre Lacazette in a #10 role after previously successful performances in the UEFA Europa League.

Positional Problems

Let's start by analyzing the positional issues that caused Arsenal problems throughout the match, including the first goal. The fullbacks, Héctor Bellerín and Kieran Tierney, assumed high positions to maintain Arsenal's high defensive line in possession, making them vulnerable to counter-attacking threats. Spurs would look to exploit this potential weakness, and they found success in the 13th minute.

Steven Bergwijn found Harry Kane in the center circle with a headed pass, but rather than tracking back and following Son Heung-min's overlapping run on the left flank, Bellerín ran inwards to apply pressure on Kane. Kane took just two touches to control the ball and evade Thomas Partey, before spraying a pass to Son.

The South Korea international found himself isolated against Rob Holding on the left wing before cutting inside and curling the ball past Bernd Leno and into the bottom right corner. Bellerín should have been marking him closely to cut off his angle; instead, he was nowhere to be seen.

Partey made his first start since November 8 in a 3-0 defeat to Aston Villa, and the Ghanian showed some positive signs by making forward runs and creating progressive passes as well, although he was taken off before halftime after suffering a recurrence of his thigh strain.

His midfield partner, Granit Xhaka, lasted the full 90 minutes, but fared even worse. Xhaka often occupied positions that should have been reserved for Gabriel in defense, and the Swiss's positioning as a makeshift left-sided center back boded poorly for Arsenal on and off the ball.

There were many instances in the game, especially in the second half, where all the midfielders were positioned ahead of the Spurs’ first line of defense. This might aid in building up from the back with short passes, but against a team that doesn’t press so highly and prefers to hit on the counter, it gives them time to reshape. This caused Arsenal to struggle to find incisive passes behind the Spurs midfield or defense. 

Unlike Mesut Özil, Lacazette is a central forward, not a central attacking midfielder. Shoehorned into an unnatural position, Lacazette struggled to do the fundamentals of a #10: occupy the half-spaces, spray passes inside the penalty area, and feed his attacking teammates with through balls.

The Midfield Conundrum 

With Arteta opting for a 4-2-3-1, Partey and Xhaka were both responsible with orchestrating the first phase of build-up and advancing the ball into the opposing half. However, with Xhaka occupying positions akin to a left-sided center back, Arsenal struggled to penetrate through the middle and progress the ball into the final third of the pitch.

With Partey picking up a hamstring injury shortly before the break, Arteta was forced to turn to Dani Ceballos on the right side of his double pivot. Ceballos and Xhaka both dropped deep to form a makeshift back four, with Bellerín and Kieran Tierney pushing forward to provide width.

However, this caused an even greater gap between Arsenal's midfield and attack, and even when Lacazette tried to drop deep and carry the ball forward, he wasn't quick enough to turn and pick out a teammate in space, meaning that Spurs could easily prepare for the Frenchman's attempted action.

Decision-making in Middle and Attacking Third

"For him, winning is a consequence of playing well with the ball on the ground, respecting his plan, staying in position and always keeping possession. He puts everything in place to get the ball up to the final third of the pitch and then trusts his team to finish the job in the only area of the field that can’t be planned for," Thierry Henry on Pep Guardiola.

Like his mentor Pep Guardiola, Arteta is a firm believer in using triangles and short passes to progress the ball into the final third. However, Arsenal struggled to churn possession into goalscoring chances due to a lack of individual quality in the final third as well as ineffective decision-making from their players.

Whilst the Gunners enjoyed 70% possession, they struggled to find a way through Tottenham's defense due to various factors; Arteta's naïve game plan, Mourinho's defensive tactics, and reactive rather than proactive decision-making from their players.

In the below example, Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang has plenty of space to collect the ball and make an underlapping run, but he instead waits for Bukayo Saka to play a cross despite being marked tightly by both Bergwijn and Serge Aurier.

Whilst Arsenal had 11 shots in contrast to Spurs's 5 shots, they had just 2 shots on goal in comparison to the home side's 3 shots on goal. Clear-cut goalscoring opportunities rarely come against in-form Mourinho sides, but even when they did come, the Gunners squandered them.

If Lacazette had played this through ball with just one touch, he could have split Eric Dier and Alderweireld and find Aubameyang in a goalscoring position, but he delayed his pass, took two touches, and threaded in the pass for Bellerín, not Aubameyang. Arsenal fans would be forgiven for missing the speed of mind and incisive passing of Özil on Saturday.

Instead of teeing up Aubameyang in a goalscoring position, Lacazette's through ball found Bellerín at the edge of the box, and the Spanish defender's attempted pass was intercepted by Aurier before it could reach Aubameyang. The Ivorian did not hastily clear it though; he found Lo Celso in ample space in midfield.

Both Lacazette and Bellerín made the wrong decision in this instance. Whilst Aubameyang was clearly making a run in behind Aurier, Bellerín decided to cut it back instead of playing the riskier, less conservative option. Instead, Aurier can easily recover possession and find his Argentine teammate in space.

Lo Celso received on the half-turn and immediately found himself in a 4v2 numerical advantage against Gabriel and Holding. He bursted forward before finding Son in space, who cut it back for Kane, who doubled Tottenham's lead shortly before halftime.

Not only did Arsenal miss Özil's incisiveness and precision in his through balls, but his ability to link midfield and attack and break down deep, compact defenses. Özil may never play another match for Arsenal again, but the Gunners cannot afford to exit the January transfer window without signing a long-term replacement for the German playmaker.

Risk in Threading Passes

Arsenal spent the majority of the second half camped inside Spurs's half, but their only major chance came in the 68th minute. Tierney played a through ball into Saka, who advanced past Aurier and fired a cross towards Lacazette, whose header bounced backwards. Willian collected the ball and teed up Bellerín for a cross, who found Lacazette in space, but the Frenchman's follow-up header was comfortably saved by Hugo Lloris.

Arsenal's failure to convert possession into goalscoring chances throughout the match can be attributed to the risk involved in attempting to progress play with short, threaded passes. By attempting to build the play with a more horizontal style, Arsenal failed to open up Tottenham's defense and find attackers in advanced positions.

In the end, despite attempting 9 corner kicks and 44 crosses, Arsenal failed to find a way through Tottenham, and the hosts even came close to a third goal in a free kick in the 81st minute, but Kane's header sailed wide of the goal.

They never came close to testing Tottenham with their crosses, perhaps owing to their lack of aerial threats in attack. It calls to mind Albert Einstein's famous quote: "The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result."

Tottenham Hotspur played in a 4-4-2 variant that looked asymmetric in and out of possession. Eric Dier was unavailable through suspension and Tanguy Ndombele would make it ten games in a row being left out of the starting XI.

Lucas Moura was preferred over winter window signing Steven Bergwijn, whilst Harry Kane played up top next to Son Heung-Min. Kane hunted his 11th goal against his regional rivals which would make him the top scorer in North London Derby history, but that goal never came.

Arteta continued with his 3-4-3 formation from recent matches, making just one change from his previous match. Club record signing Nicolas Pépé replaced Bukayo Saka in the line-up on the right of attack, alongside Lacazette and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang. Aubameyang had been involved in four goals in his last three games vs. Spurs.

Arteta's Unique Way of Playing Out of the Back

When Arsenal started playing out the back earlier in the season under Emery, it was ugly. The likes of Shkodran Mustafi and Sokratis looked uncomfortable with so much creative responsibility placed upon them, and despite Bernd Leno’s fantastic passing execution, there was little direction and design.

Upon Arteta’s hiring, Arsenal's build-up play has come leaps and bounds. Since their victory away to Southampton, Arteta has had a unique design to playing out the back that has come when deploying a formation with a back three on paper, and it worked well against Tottenham's 4-4-2.

The left center back (Sead Kolašinac) shifts out wide, positioning himself as a fullback would, in the second line, providing a balance of width to stretch the opposition's configuration. The goalkeeper then splits the two center backs, making a defined three player back line that has numerical superiority against Spurs’s first line of pressure (3v2).

As such, the left-sided center back’s positioning frees up the left wing-back, Kieran Tierney. This offers Tierney a choice to come inside creating a 3v2 against the opposition double pivot or stay wider and create a progressive passing option in an advanced position. Tierney would opt to stay wider most of the time.

Arsenal found it easy to play through the first phase of build-up against Spurs. The home side’s second line of pressure was timid in pressing Arsenal’s double pivot, which gave them time and space to receive and progress the ball. Across 90 minutes, Arteta’s men completed 260 more passes than the opposition.

There were many situations like this one below where a vertical passing option was made very easy due to the front two being stretched against Arsenal’s three player defense. Once Dani Ceballos received the pass, he had time to turn, carry and scan the pitch to make his next pass.

Lacazette's Influence as a False Nine

Oft criticized on social media for his lack of goals this season, Lacazette had a fantastic performance on the day, opening the scoring with a rocket finish. Applying himself as a false nine, he created passing angles and overloads throughout the thirds and completed the most passes out of the front three.

Without an out-and-out attacking midfielder in the lineup, the use of a false nine would function as the primary connector of the midfield and attack in Arteta's 3-2-5 in-possession formation in the middle and attacking third. Due to Tottenham using a back four, they did not have an extra man to follow Lacazette’s movements. 

When making his movements, he most commonly was looking to offer a new passing angle, and he was particularly effective when entering the situation in midfield.

Here, Granit Xhaka and Ceballos are in a 2v2 situation with Son quickly closing down Xhaka’s immediate passing option of Ceballos. Lacazette recognizes the opportunity to give Xhaka a vertical passing option, allowing the Swiss to progress past Spurs’ second line of pressure and play Lacazette into a pocket of space.

When playing through the defensive third, Mustafi carries the ball into space but his immediate passing options and space are quickly congested.

The German international finds Lacazette freely dropping towards the bottom of the center circle to offer a vertical passing option, thus preventing a potential turnover in a dangerous area to give the ball away. 

Wingback-Focused Attacks

When attacking each other’s penalty areas, both sides primarily wanted service to come from the fullbacks, or in Arsenal's case, wingbacks. 

Arsenal’s 3-2-5 used their wingbacks provide the width in attack. This allowed the front three to position themselves narrowly and attract the Tottenham fullbacks with them as they moved inside, thereby opening space out wide.

The objective from here was to circulate possession between the midfield two at a high tempo in order to catch one of the wingbacks in space, who could then find the forwards in space.

This attacking sequence below is the perfect example. Hector Bellerín plays to Ceballos who spots Tierney in space. Tierney makes a cross to the front post but it leads to nothing.

Ball circulation sometimes was not optimal due to Arsenal playing a midfield two rather than a three, and in addition, there was no chance to win the second ball to recycle possession. 

In the opposing dugout, Mourinho used an asymmetric 2-3-5 with Serge Aurier overlapping on the right and Giovani Lo Celso playing more advanced on the right side of the midfield three.

When they tried to play through the center, they struggled, as Arsenal committed numbers to defending the central zones, trusting their wingbacks to go head to head in the wide zones and assigning a center back to track forwards who dropped between the lines. 

At times, this allowed them to find Aurier in underloaded zones. From this point, Moussa Sissoko and Son would make runs in and around the left sided defenders of Arsenal’s back five in order to disorientate their decision making. 

Aurier would most commonly pass to Sissoko who after receiving the pass would drag Tierney away from the right back even further.

A simple back pass would then leave Aurier in space to cross from, although he could just as easily find a forward in space within the box. Both teams would combine to produce a total of 32 crosses. 

Mourinho Counteracts Arteta

Coming into the game, Spurs had struggled defensively, averaging an xGA of 1.6 since losing to Southampton. But in this game, things were more stable as they limited Arsenal to an xG of 0.7.

A lot of credit can go to Mourinho's half-time adjustments as he looked to cut off Arsenal's supply line and exploit space left behind. He identified Arteta’s strategy in possession as he sought to prevent his fullbacks from facing 2v1 scenarios and shut off space to Arsenal's wing-backs.

Mourinho's solution was to have the ball near midfielder to track the movements of the forward, whether it be a movement inside or underlapping run. In this case, Aurier can stay with Tierney and prevent him from having space to cross.

As Pépé begins an underlapping run through the right-sided interior channel, Lo Celso latches onto him.

Not only did changes come out of possession to deal with Arsenal’s wingbacks, but in possession as well. Mourinho looked to exploit the space being left behind them when they pushed forward, as the midfield two of Xhaka and Ceballos could not cover the vacant space.

This would be exploited by Lucas’s pace during counter attacks as he’d carry the ball forward all the way to the attacking third with little to no resistance.

Lucas finished many sequences isolated against Mustafi, leading to some very good chances created from cutbacks into the penalty area. The Brazilian ended the game with the highest xA of all Spurs players.

Conclusion

José Mourinho's game plan worked to perfection, and Tottenham's victory in the North London Derby keeps them atop the Premier League table, level on points with Liverpool yet ahead on goal differential. On the other hand, Arsenal fall to 15th in the league; they are closer to the relegation zone (6 points) than top four (7 points).

The result can be best summed up by Mourinho's post-game comments: "This ball possession story is more for sports philosophers than for me. No one has ever seen me say ‘I lost that game but I had more possession’. What matters is what you do with the ball, and with the ball, we scored two fantastic goals today. And when we had it, we never lost it in conditions where the opponent could hurt us.”

https://twitter.com/renato_senise/status/1335950283466280961

By: Sathiya Chakravarthy

In the end, neither team would score from open play passing sequences and the game would be decided on a set piece from Spurs. It was a well deserved win from the Lillywhites in the North London derby, as Mourinho proved that he still has what it takes to grind out results in crucial fixtures.

Arteta will be disappointed by the result but especially in the delivery of his wingbacks. Combining for a total of one chance created and many overhit crosses, they could have made the difference on the day.

Mourinho used Arsenal's 3-2-5 against them to create chances on the counter and counteract their possession-based game. Arteta may be inclined to switch back to his 2-3-5 as he attempts to rescue a sinking Arsenal side and fight for the final Europa League spot.

By: Craig Moniz